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Abstract
Public concern about harmful policing is surging. Governments are paying historic amounts for
law enforcement liability. Has police behavior changed? Or is society responding differently?
Traditional data sources struggle with this question. Common metrics conflate the prevalence and
severity of policing harms with the responses of legal actors such as lawyers, judges, and juries.
We overcome this problem using a new data source: liability insurance claims. Our dataset
contains 23 years of claims against roughly 350 law enforcement agencies that contract with a
single insurer. We find that, while lawsuits and payouts have trended upwards over the past decade,
insurance claims have declined. We examine multiple potential explanations. We argue that, in
our sample, police behavior is not getting worse; rather, societal responses to policing harms are
intensifying. Police litigation is not representative of the broader universe of claims and
adjudicated claims also differ systematically from settled ones.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The deaths of Michael Brown and Eric Garner in the summer of 2014 fueled widespread
public interest in, and media scrutiny of, police behavior. 1 In December of that year, Barack
Obama created the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. In the years since, a steady
stream of videos has hit the Internet depicting the use of force—sometimes deadly force—by law
enforcement officers around the country. Meanwhile, newspapers have reported rising policerelated payouts (Elinson and Frosch 2015; Winton 2017). The explanation for these trends remains
obscure, however. Is police behavior getting worse (King 2015, 2018) or simply more salient,
particularly with the rise of smartphones and body-worn cameras (McLaughlin 2015; Wines and
Cohen 2015)? There is some evidence, for example, of increasing militarization of the police,
which may in turn correlate with the fatal use of force (Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson 2018). But
it is also possible that growing societal intolerance of police-inflicted harms is driving up media
coverage and liability costs without any change in underlying police behavior.
The types of policing data available have limited our ability to discriminate among these
explanations and to ascertain the nature of, and trends in, police-inflicted harms more generally
(see Harmon 2013; Kane 2007). Of all the challenges facing researchers who study these questions,
perhaps foremost is that common data sources—such as lawsuits and payouts—conflate the
prevalence and severity of policing harms with the responses of legal actors such as lawyers,
judges, and juries. Ideally, researchers would track harmful policing incidents directly. Reliable
data of that kind, however, are rarely available, especially at scale. Given this reality, the search is
for data that bring researchers closest to the harmful behavior, such as by capturing civilian
allegations that an officer has inflicted compensable harm. If the dispute-resolution process is a
pyramid, in other words, with jury trials at the peak (Galanter 1990), the base is the set of all
potentially compensable policing harms. Researchers interested in understanding harmful police
behavior want to be as close to the base as possible.

1 Querying Google Trends (see Stephens-Davidowitz and Varian 2015) for the phrase “police brutality,” for
example, shows a jump in search activity in the United States in August 2014. Since then, search activity has remained
at levels generally higher than during the preceding decade or more. Figure A1 displays Google search activity for
“police brutality” in the United States, indexed to all Google searches and normalized to reach 100 in the highest
relative search month; the vertical line marks August 2014. Similarly, in searching the “US Newspapers” collection
in Lexis Nexis for the phrase “police brutality,” a spike in monthly coverage appears in August 2014, marked again
by a vertical line in Figure A2.
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There is a seldom-used type of data that brings us much of the way there, permitting
researchers to make progress in disentangling police behavior from the responses it triggers:
liability insurance claims. We exploit this unusual data source in this paper. Police liability insurers
open a claim every time a civilian seeks financial compensation for a police-inflicted harm,
regardless whether a lawsuit is filed or payout ultimately made. While there is selection by
civilians, sometimes with the assistance of counsel, regarding when to file claims, a claim reflects
the first step in the dispute-resolution process. Claims data are not filtered through the additional
layers of selection that produce litigation and payout data and that may bias our understanding of
police behavior. By comparing claims data with these other data types, moreover, we are able to
isolate and describe the latter selection process.
We demonstrate the importance of these points with a novel dataset containing 23 years of
police liability claims against roughly 350 small and midsized police agencies in a midsized state
(by population), compiled by a single insurer whose identity we have agreed to conceal. In addition
to bringing us closer to the harmful behavior researchers aim to study, the dataset’s expansive time
horizon—covering 23 years up through 2017—allows us to measure time trends, helping to
contextualize today’s contentious policing environment. That our data cover hundreds of agencies,
moreover, ensures that the trends we observe are not driven by idiosyncracies in a single or small
number of jurisdictions. Indeed, we are aware of no other dataset that covers so many agencies for
so many years.2
Our data allow us to make three central contributions. First, from a methodological
perspective, we demonstrate the extent to which the analysis of policing harms depends on the
type of data used to measure those harms. By comparing our overall sample with the subsets of
claims that involve lawsuits or lawsuits with payouts, we show that police litigation—however
ultimately resolved—is not representative of the broader universe of claims. In fact, using lawsuits
or payouts to proxy for policing harms would have led to opposite conclusions about the direction
of police performance in our sample over the past decade. Furthermore, claims data allow us to
observe settled cases as well as adjudicated ones, so we can directly test the Priest-Klein
hypothesis, which predicts bias in the selection of disputes for litigation. We show that, in our data,

2 Kane and White (2013, p. 3) present “perhaps the largest study of police misconduct ever conducted in the
United States, with a study period spanning from 1975 through 1996,” a total of 22 years. They study a single agency,
albeit the nation’s largest—the New York City Police Department.
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adjudicated claims differ systematically from settled ones, consistent with Priest-Klein but in
contrast to recent empirical work by Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018). We discuss how these
contrasting results may stem from differences in the institutional environments we study.
Second, we present new evidence on the prevalence, composition, cost, and resolution of
police liability allegations over time within a stable set of agencies. Consistent with evidence from
other sources (Elinson and Frosch 2015; Winton 2017), we find that payouts have trended upward
over time, and sharply so in recent years. The rate at which claims pay out, as well as the number
of lawsuits, have also climbed since 2005. Yet the overall number of claims has declined, possibly
due in part to loss-prevention techniques like those detailed in Rappaport (2017). Our data come
from a single state, and from law enforcement agencies serving small and midsized localities—the
average jurisdiction in our dataset has roughly 9,000 inhabitants. Although these are not the places
policing researchers most commonly study, they are home to many millions of Americans.
According to the 2010 Census, around 20% of the U.S. population lives in municipalities with
fewer than 2,500 residents and 30% lives in municipalities under 50,000 (Ratcliffe et al. 2016).
Furthermore, 70% of police agencies serve localities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants (Reaves
2015). Our data therefore shed light on a large and understudied slice of American policing.
Finally, we consider several potential explanations for the opposing trends we observe in
the number of claims and resolution of those claims. These include the rise in smartphone and
body-worn camera technologies, changes in qualified immunity doctrine, and deteriorating policecommunity relations. We argue that the observed trends are most consistent with an intensified
societal response to policing harms. Through this exercise, the paper extends the economics-ofcrime literature focused on police behavior. A sizable literature studies the effects of policing on
crime (see Levitt and Miles (2006) for a review). Other work examines the determinants of officer
productivity (Chandrasekher 2016; Mas 2006) and racial disparities in stops and arrests (see, for
example, Anwar and Fang (2006)). Economic research into police misconduct, specifically, has
emerged only recently. In the last few years, researchers have measured police misconduct either
as the primary outcome of interest (Rozema and Schanzenbach 2019; Fryer 2019) or as the
consequence of different policy environments (Chandrasekher 2017; Dharmapala, McAdams, and
Rappaport 2019). To our knowledge, our paper is the first to attempt to illuminate the distinction
between long-term trends in police behavior and societal responses to it.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how policing data have
hamstrung prior research and how insurance claims data allow researchers to tackle questions
incompletely explored by prior work. Section 3 describes our claims data in detail. Section 4
illustrates the data’s potential by reporting and interpreting results concerning trends in police
liability. It then more broadly demonstrates the importance of data selection for policing research.
Section 5 discusses the results, using the data to benchmark findings from prior research and
outlining the study’s limitations. Section 6 concludes.

2. MEASURING POLICE BEHAVIOR
Section 2.1 describes how prior policing research has been limited by its data. Section 2.2
explains why insurance claims data give researchers traction on important but underexamined
questions.
2.1. Prior Literature
Research on police behavior has generally relied on a small number of data sources. We
review those sources here, noting various shortcomings that have limited the reach of prior work.
Lawsuits. Many studies, especially those focused on financial liability, exploit publicly
available records of lawsuits (Eisenberg 1982; Kappeler 2006; Leong 2012; Powell, Meitl, and
Worrall 2017; Ross 2000; Worrall and Gutierrez 1999). Because procedural and financial obstacles
tend to “filter out marginal or frivolous cases,” lawsuits are thought to constitute a high-quality
sample of liability disputes (Rozema and Schanzenbach 2019, p. 231). At the same time, legal
scholars have long believed that cases selected for litigation are “neither a random nor a
representative sample” of the universe of disputes (Priest and Klein 1984, p. 4). Among other
concerns, defendants can influence the number of suits filed against them. They can, for example,
opt to settle politically embarrassing disputes or high-quality claims they expect to lose. An
agency’s low lawsuit count, therefore, could signal either responsible policing or an aggressive
settlement strategy. In addition, plaintiffs’ lawyers filter cases not for legal merit but for expected
value, which encompasses concerns orthogonal to merit, such as the personal characteristics of
potential clients and the nature of their injuries. Plaintiffs’ attorneys may be more likely to file
low-quality, high-dollar lawsuits than high-quality, low-dollar suits, leaving the latter
undercounted.
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Payouts. Data on public payouts, also familiar to academic research (Iris 2012, 2014;
Rozema and Schanzenbach 2019; Schwartz 2014, 2016), may capture some cases lawsuit data
miss. Few jurisdictions make payout data readily accessible, though they are typically covered by
public records laws and can be gathered with sufficient effort. Yet payout data also confront
significant selection effects, as disputes are filtered by multiple legal actors on the path to
resolution. Unsuccessful claims, too, are wholly omitted. As a practical matter, in working with
payout data, it can also be difficult to determine what cases localities are counting as “policerelated” (Iris 2014).
Civilian Complaints. Another approach is to examine civilian complaints about police
behavior (Chandrasekher 2017; Chanin 2016; Kane and White 2009; Lersch and Mieczkowski
2000). Civilian complaints can be valuable for comparing officers within a large agency (see
Rozema and Schanzenbach 2019). Yet researchers cannot meaningfully aggregate or compare
civilian complaints across agencies because data structures vary substantially (Hickman and Poore
2016). Relatedly, Ba (2018) finds that the physical location of the oversight agency where
complaints are signed affects the likelihood that civilians will complete the complaint-filing
process. This suggests that small barriers can have real effects on civilian reporting; it is certainly
possible that more substantial obstacles have even larger effects, making cross-jurisdictional or
even intertemporal comparisons difficult to interpret.
In addition, civilian complaints data are frequently unavailable, or unreliable, especially
for smaller agencies. Hickman and Poore (2016, p. 472) find “many examples of erratic reporting”
in their audit of data submitted by “small” agencies (100 to 249 officers) to the Law Enforcement
Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey. Many agencies in their study,
moreover, both large and small, had purged their records under record-retention laws after as little
as three years. Civilian complaints and insurance claims also capture different types of police
behaviors. Where good civilian complaints data are available, they tend to feature allegations of
failure to provide service and “discourtesy” (Ba 2018; NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board
2017). These are important for understanding police-community relations but less helpful for
studying the types of incidents that trigger the regulatory apparatus of civil liability. Indeed, there
are disincentives to filing civilian complaints over incidents that cause financially compensable
harm, as documents submitted in connection with the complaint may become admissible in any
later litigation (Rozema and Schanzenbach 2019).
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Civilian Deaths. In recent years, journalists and activists have compiled databases that
collect information on officer-involved shootings and civilian deaths. Researchers have begun to
use these data sources, which are close to comprehensive, in peer-reviewed work (Campbell, Nix,
and Maguire 2017; Jennings and Rubato 2017; Legewie and Fagan 2016; Mesic et al. 2018;
Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty, and Fernandez 2017; Ross 2015). Yet the most inclusive one,
Mapping Police Violence, contains only six years of data. For measuring police misconduct,
moreover, these databases are simultaneously underinclusive, as they capture only the most
extreme incidents, which are statistically rare, and overinclusive, as they include some legally
justified killings that may not count as “misconduct” by reasonable standards, such as cases of
officer self-defense.
2.2. Insurance Claims Data
Insurance claims data allow us to tackle some questions incompletely explored by prior
work. A challenge in policing research is that most common data sources—particularly lawsuits
and payouts—conflate the prevalence and severity of policing harms with the responses of legal
actors such as lawyers, judges, and juries. Using insurance claims data to study policing does not
eliminate these selection effects, as there is still selection into claims, but it does reduce their
influence, as claims lie closest to the base of the dispute-resolution pyramid. In particular, we can
track disputes beginning when they are initially filed and before claim-processing begins.
Defendants cannot control the number of claims they incur by changing their settlement behavior.
The plaintiffs’ bar also plays a smaller role in filtering claims, as claims are easier than lawsuits to
file without legal assistance. 3 Cutting through these layers of selection allows researchers to
disaggregate the responses of legal actors such as lawyers, judges, and juries from the prevalence
and severity of policing harms.
In addition, because the insurance mechanism requires spreading risk, each insurer
typically covers many law enforcement agencies. This mitigates the concern that observable
patterns in the data might reflect the idiosyncrasies of one or a small number of agencies. Data for
covered agencies, moreover, are collected consistently across time and place and well preserved,
making them valuable for studying time trends and—while not the focus of this paper—crossjurisdictional questions as well.
3 There are no systematic data on the rate of representation of insurance claimants. As one point of reference, in
the past several years, the rate was around 20 to 30 percent in our sample.
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Finally, insurance data give researchers an unprecedented view of policing outside the
nation’s largest cities. Empirical research rarely covers smaller agencies, 4 generating an oft-noted
“big-city bias” in the literature (see Barrett, Haberfeld, and Walker 2009; Crow and Adrion 2011;
Terrill, Leinfelt, and Kwak 2008; Walker and Katz 2008). This scholarly bias mirrors a similar
skew in national media coverage. In recent years, just three cities—New York, Chicago, and Los
Angeles—generated between half and two-thirds of all stories about “police misconduct” in the
Associated Press and the 50 most widely circulated newspapers, despite employing less than 12%
of sworn officers nationwide and accounting for only 4% of police-related civilian deaths.5
Big-city bias may warp our understanding of policing harms to the extent that big-city
policing differs from policing elsewhere. The United States has over 12,000 local police
departments. Roughly half of them employ 10 or fewer officers (Reaves 2015). Around 78% of
the country’s sworn officers serve populations of fewer than a million residents, 66% serve
populations below 500,000, and 46% serve populations smaller than 100,000 (Reaves 2015).6 Nor
does the lion’s share of crime and policing happen in the biggest cities (Fox 2017). Back-of-theenvelope calculations suggest that roughly two-thirds of FBI index crimes, arrests, and policerelated fatalities occur outside the 100 largest cities. (For perspective, Fremont, California;
Garland, Texas; and Hialeah, Florida make the 100-largest-cities list.)7 If anything, these numbers
may increase over time if experts are right that “the periphery,” rather than the urban core, “remains

4 Indeed, it is not uncommon for studies to exclude agencies that serve fewer than 100,000 residents (Parker et al.
2005; Smith 2004). The few exceptions consist principally of descriptions of individual jurisdictions (Garcia and Cao
2005; Lytle and Randa 2015; Payne, Berg, and Sun 2005; but see Liederbach 2005, 2007, examining multiple
jurisdictions). Yet some evidence suggests that smaller agencies differ meaningfully from larger ones in structure,
professionalization, and personnel (Falcone, Wells, and Weisheit 2002; Weisheit, Wells, and Falcone 1995). Smaller
departments, for example, often lack big-city protocols for investigating policing harms, including shootings of
civilians (Toner and Rutecki 2018).
5 In the Lexis database “Major U.S. Newspapers,” which contains the top 50 U.S. papers by circulation, a search
for the phrase “police misconduct” on October 11, 2017 turned up 431 stories during the immediately preceding year.
After filtering the results for duplicates and relevance, 66% of the stories concerned the three largest cities. Likewise,
a search of the Lexis database “Associated Press” on the same day generated 167 results. The top three cities accounted
for 54% of the filtered results. The ten largest cities generated 70% and 58% of the stories, respectively. Employment
figures are from 2013, as reported in Reaves (2015). Data on police-related civilian deaths are from Mapping Police
Violence (2019).
6 The figures look even starker if one counts agencies rather than officers: 94% of police departments serve fewer
than 50,000 people, 70% serve fewer than 10,000 people, and 40% serve fewer than 2,500 people (Reaves 2015).
7 Data for the crime and arrest figures are from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for 2016 as compiled in Kaplan
(2017). Crimes are actual reported offenses; arrests are clearances by arrest. Where cities did not report, they were
skipped in the city counts. Data for the police-related-civilian-deaths calculation are from Mapping Police Violence
(2019) for January 2013 through November 2017 and 2016 U.S. Census estimates.
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the dominant, and fastest growing, part of the American landscape” (Kotkin and Berger 2017;
Infinite Suburbia 2017).
Only two studies, to our knowledge, have relied upon insurance claims data. McCoy (2010)
exploits claims data from 1974 to 1984 from a defunct insurer that had covered counties
nationwide. She uses the data to assess the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1978 decision
holding municipalities amenable to suit under federal civil rights law. Based on a pre/post
comparison, she finds that the number of claims and their outcomes did not materially change, but
that the number of wrongful death lawsuits increased. Closest to our endeavor, Ross and Bodapati
(2006) analyze 15 years of law enforcement liability claims data—from 1985 to 1999—from the
Michigan Municipal Risk Management Authority. They present certain aggregate information
over time, such as the total cost of claims for all agencies or the percentage of claims that were
litigated. Their data, however, are limited in several important respects. First, Ross and Bodapati
cannot verify whether the same agencies were covered throughout their observation period,
making it difficult to interpret time trends. Second, they cannot determine, in general, whether
their claims relate to law enforcement or to detention functions. In addition, their dataset includes
employment claims and their liability claims are dominated by auto accidents. Finally, their
observation period ends almost 20 years ago, so they cannot speak to recent trends, which hold
substantial interest given current policy debates.
Before describing our dataset, we offer two caveats about claims data generally. First, even
though claims data capture incidents that other data miss, they do not count every incident
involving policing harm—there is selection into claims. Second, because the largest cities in the
country, which may be some of the most racially diverse, tend to self-insure, claims data may be
unhelpful for studying discriminatory policing, unless they are drawn from states with diverse
populations (or large populations of people of color) outside their biggest cities.

3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA
We illustrate the points made in Section 2 by using insurance claims to study trends in
police liability in our sample over the past two decades. Our dataset consists of claims data
provided by a single insurer in a midsized state (“the Insurer”) under an agreement to preserve the
Insurer’s anonymity. The data cover roughly 350 law enforcement agencies over a period of 23
years. This is the largest and most detailed dataset of police insurance claims ever employed in
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academic research. We begin with a brief background on the Insurer. We then describe the dataset
in detail.
3.1. Institutional Background
Police liability insurance is common nationwide (see Rappaport 2017 for details).
Providers include both for-profit carriers and intergovernmental risk pools. The latter are
organizations formed by groups of local governmental entities to finance a risk, typically by
pooling or sharing that risk. The exact number of localities that purchase police liability insurance
is unknown but is thought to be a majority share. The market breakdown is also unknown. As a
very general matter, however, small localities tend to join pools; midsized entities divide between
pools and commercial carriers; and the largest localities self-insure. Even self-insured localities,
though, often purchase excess coverage on the market.
The Insurer furnishes third-party liability coverage to its policyholders on a variety of lines,
including automobile, employers’ liability, and workers’ compensation. We focus on the coverage
it provides for liability triggered by police operations, which is part of a comprehensive liability
coverage package. Roughly 350 agencies in one midsized state obtain police liability coverage
from the Insurer. Consistent with the general pattern nationwide, a handful of the largest cities in
the state, fewer than 10, self-insure and are not included in this total. The Insurer does capture the
vast majority of the state’s municipal police departments, however, corresponding to about 60%
of the state’s population. The covered agencies tend to be small, with most having 10 or fewer fulltime officers.
The Insurer’s police liability coverage is of the typical sort described in Rappaport (2017).
It reaches nearly all losses stemming from sworn police activities that cause personal injury or
property damage. The localities and their officers all are covered; for convenience, though, we will
generally refer to claims as running against agencies. Deliberate violations of the law and criminal
acts are excluded from coverage, though the Insurer will typically defend an officer suspected of
such conduct under a “reservation of rights”; the Insurer will also defend the locality. Acts
committed outside an officer’s official capacity are excluded as well. 8

8 The deliberate and criminal acts exclusion would apply to incidents in which there is no arguable legal
justification for the officer’s act, such as the sexual assault of a detainee. Even then, many insurers would defend the
officer, subject to a reservation of rights, unless and until he is convicted of a crime (Rappaport 2017). The Insurer
informed us that it very rarely invokes the exclusion, which is consistent with general industry practice (Rappaport
2017).
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A “claim,” for our purposes, represents a file the Insurer opens upon demand by an
individual (the “claimant”) for compensation from a covered agency for a police-related harm.
Most often, claimants make demands to the localities or agencies, which report them to the Insurer.
On rare occasions, claimants submit demands directly to the Insurer, which then coordinates with
the locality, or the Insurer opens a claim in anticipation of a demand, which is typically followed
by an actual demand. The claims-making process is consistent across localities. To our knowledge,
the principal change in the process over time has been increasing reliance on the Internet as a
substitute for in-person claims submission.
The claims process is independent from litigation in the sense that claimants are not
required to initiate or exhaust the claims process before suing, nor are they required to sue at all in
order to receive compensation. In other words, some claimants never sue, some sue without first
engaging in out-of-court negotiation with the Insurer, and some sue after negotiation fails. If the
process is started when the claimant initiates a lawsuit, this is also considered a claim for our
purposes, meaning that every lawsuit against a covered agency for which the Insurer provides
coverage will be included in our dataset.
3.2. Data
The Insurer initially provided us a raw, claims-level dataset of all police liability claims
filed between 1992 and June 30, 2018, containing a total of 3,353 claims. Unlike in Ross and
Bodapati (2006), police-related claims that fall under separate employment or automobile policies
are not included; nor are workers’ compensation claims. It is worth noting at the outset, however,
that not all of our claims allege what, colloquially, might be called “police misconduct.” As Kane
and White (2013) discuss at length, there is no expert consensus on how to define this term. Merely
negligent infliction of personal or property harm, for example, may violate state tort law but
probably not the U.S. Constitution. Is this “misconduct”? It is behavior society would prefer not
occur, and it can cause serious harm (including death). Yet it lacks the element of willfulness some
might expect from “police misconduct.” For this reason, when referring to claims generically, we
use terms like “policing harms” or “police-inflicted harms,” reserving the term “misconduct” for
discussing prior literature using the term.
Each claim in the dataset has a unique identifier and is associated with a specific law
enforcement agency. For each claim, we observe a brief description of the underlying incident (the
“loss description”). For claims that are closed, we see whether a lawsuit was filed—and, if so, how
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it was resolved—as well as payouts, expenses, and deductible payments. We also observe the dates
on which the incident allegedly occurred, the claim was reported to the Insurer, and the Insurer
formally opened and closed the claim. In our temporal analyses, we focus on the reporting date.
The loss description field characterizes the incident, not the legal arguments claimants
make. If, for example, a claimant alleges that an officer used excessive force in arresting her, and
argues that the locality is liable because it failed to train the officer adequately, the loss description
will reflect the underlying alleged use of force but typically will not mention the failure-to-train
allegation. What we refer to as “payouts” includes money paid to the claimant under either a
settlement or judgment. It also includes the claimant’s attorney fees, whether taken from the
claimant’s recovery—such as in a contingent-fee arrangement—or separately delineated, which is
rare. When claims have multiple claimants, we include a single observation per claim, and we sum
payouts made to all of the claimants. Our data are therefore at the incident level and not at the
claimant level.
The earliest reported claims are from 1992 but, due to data-quality concerns, we exclude
all 333 claims reported before 1995. For analyses involving claims outcomes, we limit our sample
to closed-claims data, as open-claims data are necessarily incomplete. And because many claims
from 2016 through 2018 remain open, we also exclude from these analyses 218 closed claims from
these most recent years. There are only eight open claims from 2015 and earlier, however, meaning
our pre-2016 data are essentially complete (Figure A3).
We also exclude certain types of claims against unusual agencies. First, we exclude 127
claims against a couple dozen multi-jurisdictional, specialized task forces focused on problems
like drugs or violent crime. These agencies differ in kind from general-services police departments.
Among other things, oversight responsibility is spread among numerous jurisdictions, some of
which are entities not otherwise covered by the Insurer. In contrast, we do include in our main
analyses claims against a few multi-jurisdictional, general-services police departments. These
agencies are formed by small clusters of neighboring municipalities, all of which are themselves
covered by the Insurer, simply to achieve economies of scale. Second, we exclude 36 claims
against agencies that did not exist, or did not obtain coverage from the Insurer, throughout the
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entire observation period.9 Our findings are qualitatively similar when we relax any of the abovementioned restrictions.
This winnowing process left us with 2,858 claims across 23 years and 2,590 closed claims,
for which we can see claim outcomes, across 21 years.10 To study the substantive composition of
claims, we developed a coding scheme consisting of the following eight salient types of policerelated harms plus one residual category, which we applied to claims based on the “loss
description” field:
1. Force: Excessive force
2. Sexual: Sexual misconduct (e.g., sexual assault, coerced sexual activity)
3. Property Harm: Property damage or loss (e.g., damage to door upon entry, items lost
during arrest, animals injured, car damage from pursuit)
4. Seizure of Person: Illegal seizure of a person (e.g., false arrest, unlawful detention)
5. Seizure of Property: Illegal seizure of property (e.g., illegal forfeiture, improper towing or
impoundment of vehicle
6. Search: Illegal search
7. Discrimination: Discriminatory policing (including profiling based on race, sex, religion,
ethnicity, or national origin)
8. Negligence: Negligence resulting in personal injury (e.g., inadvertent K9 bite, accidental
discharge of weapon)
9. Other (e.g., unspecified violation of constitutional rights, failure to investigate, defamation)
We also flagged any claim that involved a civilian fatality or vehicular pursuit. Multiple claim
types could be assigned to a single claim. Claims that did not fit into any of our categories were

9 Specifically, we exclude claims from agencies that opened or closed, or obtained or lost coverage, between 2007
and 2015, the period for which we have such information. Only 1.6% of claims between 2007 and 2015, and 1.26%
of claims between 1995 and 2007, are from such agencies. Our results are very similar when we include these claims.
There may be a small number of additional claims from agencies that opened or closed, or obtained or lost coverage,
between 1995 and 2007, but we cannot identify these claims. Given the stability of our results regardless whether we
include the claims from agencies that changed status between 2007 and 2015, we think their exclusion (were it possible)
would not change our results substantially.
10 Note that there were multiple reasons to drop some claims. Our findings are qualitatively similar when we
include any of the dropped claims.
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classified as “Other.”11 The most common allegations in claims classified as Other include failure
to intervene or investigate, defamation, and misuse of confidential information.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on our closed claims data—overall and by type of
claim. Out of the 2,590 closed claims, 32% involve a lawsuit and 30% lead to some payout being
made, though these figures vary greatly across claim type. Claims for property damage or loss are
most common, followed by use of force. When successful (i.e., when resulting in some payout),
claims for discriminatory policing, use of force, and sexual misconduct result in the highest
average payouts. Overall, mean payouts for successful claims are $23,700 (median: $700).
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The dataset contains an average of 123 claims per year across all of the covered agencies.
In recent years, the covered agencies experienced an average of fewer than 5 claims per year per
100 officers. These seemingly small numbers may suggest that policing harms are less common
(at least in some places) than is commonly thought, that many harms go unreported, or some
combination of the two.

4. PRINCIPAL RESULTS
We report our main findings in three parts. In Section 4.1, we present time-trend evidence
on the number and substantive composition of claims in our sample, as well as claim outcomes. In
Section 4.2, we consider potential explanations for these trends. In Section 4.3, we use our data to
demonstrate the importance of data selection in studying the police.
4.1. Trends in Frequency, Composition, and Resolution of Claims Against Police
Agencies
Our data, which span more than two decades, allow us to explore time trends in the number,
type, and resolution of claims against police agencies in our sample. Motivating this analysis—
and as noted above—public interest in police brutality, as well as media coverage, have spiked in
recent years (Figures A1 and A2). Is this because police behavior has worsened over time? Or are
legal responses intensifying, possibly because people are simply paying more attention? Our data
can help us get traction on this question.

11 A pair of law-student research assistants manually and independently coded each claim. When they agreed on
the coding, we adopted their coding decisions; when they disagreed, one of us made the ultimate determination of
how to code the claim.
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We ask first whether the total number of claims against the police in our sample has
increased over time. Figure 1 plots the number of claims against all covered agencies, including
open claims, reported each year between 1995 and 2017. There is no apparent increase in recent
years to explain the heightened interest in police behavior. In fact, the number of claims has
decreased over time, from an average of 135 claims per year in the 1990s, to 127 claims per year
in the 2000s, to 106 claims per year in the 2010s. Nor do we see any uptick in claims to match the
spike in interest in the summer of 2014. Note that the downward trend in claims cannot be
explained by a declining population in the localities served by agencies in our data, as the
population was steadily rising while claims declined. Indeed, when we plot claims per capita (not
reported), the trend looks very similar to Figure 1. 12
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Trends in the aggregate number of claims may mask variation in the substantive types of
claims that citizens bring. If claims for property damage are going down, for example, while useof-force claims are rising, the appearance of overall stability (or improvement) may be deceiving.
The graphs in Figure 2 break out claims reported by substantive type, with different scales on the
y-axes across the graphs. While we do see year-to-year variation in the substantive composition of
claims, there are no obvious trends and no clear increase in recent years for the most serious
allegations—in particular, those involving fatalities, excessive force, or seizure of a person (i.e.,
false arrest). Overall, Figures 1 and 2 show that increased scrutiny of the police has occurred in a
context in which claims were, if anything, decreasing.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
When we look at payouts, however, the trends are anything but stable, as shown in Figures
3 and 4. The top-left graph in Figure 3 plots the total payouts (in real 2015 dollars) made by all
agencies for all claim types. Consistent with media reports (Elinson and Frosch 2015; Winton
2017), the trend is clearly upward; sharply so in 2014 and 2015. Between 2013 and 2015 alone,
total annual payouts rose almost tenfold, from $400,000 to $3.97 million. Multiple factors could
be driving this trend in total payouts: a rising claimant “win rate” (i.e., an increasing share of claims
leading to payouts), rising average payouts per claim, or some combination of the two. The next

12 Nor can the decline in claims be explained by changes in the claims-submission process over time. As noted
in Section 3.1, the principal change has been increasing reliance on the Internet as a substitute for in-person
submission, which would tend to increase the number of incidents reported in more recent years.
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two graphs in Figure 3 show that both factors are at play—claimants are winning more often and
taking home more dollars per “successful” claim (i.e., per claim with a positive payout). And, as
with total payouts, average payouts shoot rapidly upward in 2014 and 2015, rising from about
$4,000 to about $40,000 per claim.13 Finally, the bottom-right graph in Figure 3, which depicts the
number (rather than percentage) of successful claims, shows that the rising win rate is partly, but
not entirely, an artifact of the declining total number of claims. The number of successful claims
increases throughout our observation period, from an average of 33 per year in the 1990s, to 37
per year in the 2000s, to 39 per year in the 2010s.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Particularly given the stark increase in recent years, it is possible that outliers are driving
the increase in average payouts. Given that most claims are fairly small, a few multi-million-dollar
claims involving fatalities, for example, could pull the averages up. Figure 4, however, rules out
this explanation. Figure 4 presents the median, first-, and third-quartile payouts, which are also
climbing during our observation period. Between 2013 and 2015, the median payout per claim
rose by from $1,400 to $3,700. Most of that increase occurred during the last five years of the
sample. This is all the more significant given that the number of successful claims is rising too; it
would be reasonable to think that low-dollar claims might be driving the latter trend, which would
drive median payouts down.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
Figures 1 through 4, then, leave us with the following puzzle: Over the past two decades,
the overall number of claims in our sample is stable or declining. This might suggest the police are
involved in a shrinking number of harmful incidents—in other words, that police behavior is
improving within our sample. Yet there is also some evidence suggesting that police behavior may
be getting worse. The number of successful claims is climbing. Likewise, payouts—total, mean,
and median—are rising, and spike sharply upwards in recent years. In the next section, we consider
multiple potential explanations for this collection of trends.
13 We do not include graphs showing total and mean payouts by claim type because, given that only 30% of claims
pay out, the data are too sparse. Our analysis of the data does suggest, however, that the trends in total and mean
payouts are driven largely by the trends in payouts for claims involving fatalities or excessive force.
It is possible that some of the increase in observed payouts is attributable to changes in claimants’ attorney fees
rather than compensatory payments to the claimant. Because the division of payouts is typically a matter between
claimants and their attorneys, our data do not permit us to speak to this point with precision. In the minority of claims
in which separate payments were made to claimants and their counsel, however, we do not observe any upward trend
in the attorney’s share, though the number of observations is too small to support any firm conclusions.
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4.2. Mechanisms and Interpretation
Several phenomena could potentially explain the juxtaposition of falling claims with a
rising claimant win rate and rising payouts. We consider three candidate explanations in turn:
claimant selection of claims may have improved; policing harms may have become more severe,
even if less frequent; and societal responses to policing harms may have grown more punitive.
While our data do not permit a definitive answer, we argue that the available evidence favors the
last explanation.
4.2.1. Improved Claim Selection
The first potential explanation is that, during our observation period, claimants became
more selective in bringing claims. This could have occurred for a variety of reasons, though two
stand out from policing debates: (1) more video evidence of police-citizen encounters and (2)
changes in qualified immunity doctrine. We consider each separately, as each generates slightly
different predictions.
The introduction of body-worn cameras, and the rising popularity of smartphones, have
improved available evidence of some police-citizen encounters. Prospective claimants with lowquality claims may have become less likely to file knowing that video footage would tend to defeat
their allegations. Claimants with high-quality claims, in contrast, possessed better evidence than
in the past. This improved their odds of winning and increased expected damages per win,
assuming video evidence elicits emotional responses from jurors by making harms more vivid. If
this explanation were correct, we would expect to see several patterns in the data. Coincident with
the introduction of these video-recording technologies: (1) the number of claims should decline,
as low-quality claims are withheld; (2) claimants’ win rate should rise, as average claim quality
increases; and (3) average payouts should rise, as average claim quality and the emotional appeal
of claimants’ evidence both increase. The explanation is consistent with multiple patterns in total
payouts—whether total payouts increase depends on whether the effects of higher average payouts
swamp the effects of reduced frequency of claims. This explanation, in other words, is consistent
with the rising trend in total payouts but not does require it.
Although we observe all three of these trends over our sample period, the timing of
pertinent events allows us to reject this explanation: the observed trends occur too early relative to
the popularization of these video-recording technologies. According to the Insurer, as of 2016,
fewer than 10 of the 350 agencies in our sample were using body-worn cameras. Similarly, very
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few, if any, claims during our sample period involved video evidence from smartphones. 14 The
rise of these technologies may change patterns of police liability in the future but it cannot explain
the trends we examine here.
Developments in legal doctrine may also have altered claim selection. In particular,
changes in qualified immunity doctrine, which shields government employees from suit as long as
they discharge their duties reasonably, may have hindered plaintiffs in many types of litigation
against the police (Baude 2018). By effectively raising plaintiffs’ burden of proof, these changes
may have reduced the expected value of lawsuits and thus the “threat value” of lawsuits to
claimants who hoped to settle claims without litigation. Prospective claimants, therefore, may have
become less likely to file marginal claims. Unlike the new video technologies, however, the
expansion of qualified immunity protections would have had no effect on the quality or emotional
appeal of evidence for claims ultimately brought. In other words, claims that were filed
notwithstanding the heightened barriers to suit were of no greater value after than before the
doctrinal shifts. If this explanation were correct, we would expect that: (1) the number of claims
and (2) lawsuits should gradually decline, as prospective claimants withhold marginal claims and
suits; (3) claimants’ win rate and (4) average payouts should gradually rise, as average claim
quality increases; and (5) total payouts should decline, as marginal claims are withheld and the
value of successful claims is unchanged.
There are three reasons to reject this explanation. First, the number of lawsuits does not
gradually decline. In Figure 5, we plot the number of lawsuits over time alongside the number of
successful lawsuits (i.e., lawsuits with positive payouts) and the overall number of claims. We also
include smoothed trend lines. Contrary to expectations, the number of lawsuits has been steadily
climbing since 2005.15

14 The Insurer’s reported experience on this point is consistent with other evidence regarding the popularization
of filming the police with smartphones. For example, the ACLU released its “Mobile Justice” smartphone application,
which facilitates civilian recording of the police, shortly before the end of our sample period. It is worth noting, too,
that our claims are organized by the date on which they were reported to the Insurer. Our dataset contains only six
excessive-force claims regarding incidents that allegedly occurred (and thus could have been filmed) in 2015. Among
other things, these claims could not be driving the recent jump in median damages we observe in Figure 4.
15 Figure 5 also suggests that number of claims is a better measure than number of lawsuits of the incidence of
policing harms. If we assume that number of claims proxies for the number of policing harms, there are several reasons
why the number of lawsuits might rise and fall (and rise again) during the observation period. The behavior of the
plaintiffs’ bar, which has historically shifted its attention among litigation areas, could explain this trend. But if we
assume instead that number of lawsuits proxies for the number of policing harms, it is significantly more difficult to
explain why the number of claims moves in the way it does.
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[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
Second, the large spike in average payouts in 2014 (Figure 3, top-right graph) is also inconsistent
with expectations. As stated, qualified immunity doctrine is generally understood to have
gradually raised the bar for plaintiff success. No single judicial decision since 1995 stands out as
a game changer (see Baude (2018), pp. 88-90 for a comprehensive list of the Supreme Court’s
qualified immunity decisions). Finally, and once again contrary to expectations, total payouts are
clearly trending upwards (Figure 3, top-left graph).
4.2.2. Increasing Severity of Harm
A second potential explanation for the trends presented in section 4.1 is that, while the
frequency of policing harms decreased during our observation period, the severity of harms
increased. It could be that police are interacting with civilians less often but that interactions are
more volatile because police-community relations are deteriorating and the police are increasingly
militarized (Delehanty et al. 2017; Lawson 2018). If this were the case, (1) claim severity should
increase, either across or within claim types, especially after the events of 2014, and (2) average
payouts should rise, as harms are increasingly severe. This explanation could be consistent with
multiple patterns in total payouts or claimant win rate.
Our data do not permit us to reject this explanation with certainty, but we offer several
reasons for skepticism. First, external evidence casts doubt on the motivating premise. While
survey findings do suggest that confidence in the police declined between 2013 and 2015 (from
57 to 52% nationwide), during our sample period more generally, public confidence was fairly
stable (ranging between 52 and 64%) (Jones 2015). There is no sign, in other words, of a persistent
decline in police-community relations. Nor does existing evidence support the assumption that a
deteriorating relationship would aggravate policing harms. Multiple studies have found that, if
anything, the police backed off, rather than leaned in, after Ferguson (Morgan and Pally 2016;
Shjarback et al. 2017). Over three-quarters of police officers surveyed in 2016, for example,
indicated that Ferguson and other high-profile events have made them more reluctant to use force
when it is appropriate (Morin et al. 2017).
Second, we find no evidence that claim severity increased, either across or within claim
types. As an initial matter, recall that Figure 2 shows no clear trends over time in the substantive
composition of claims. It is not the case, for example, that claims for property damage are
consistently growing less common while excessive-force claims are growing more so. If claims
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are becoming more severe, it is happening within-type, in unobservable ways. One way to approach
the question is to examine claims involving fatalities, many (though not all) of which concern
severe examples of use of force. If within-type severity is increasing, we might expect fatalities to
increase as well. Yet Figure 2 confirms that the number of fatalities is not rising over time. Our
data on this point are consistent with external, national data sources that show a high, but stable,
number of police-related civilian deaths each year (Mapping Police Violence 2019). Furthermore,
in Figure A4, we show that there is no increase in the number of claims whose descriptions mention
officer-involved shootings (identified by searching the text of the “loss description” field) or
vehicular pursuits.
4.2.3. Changing Societal Attitudes
Our final potential explanation for the trends we observe, and the one we find most
compelling, is that society grew increasingly intolerant of harmful policing, especially after the
spike in public scrutiny and media coverage precipitated by the events of 2014 (Figures A1 and
A2). Juries may have become more inclined to issue large damage awards upon finding liability.
They may also have grown increasingly willing to believe plaintiffs and disbelieve police officers
in close cases, or to deny police the benefit of the doubt. This would be consistent with other
evidence that public behavior—such as calls to 911—changes markedly in response to highly
publicized cases of police violence (Desmond, Papachristos, and Kirk 2016).
Of course, civil juries resolve a very small number of claims; most claims are settled out
of court. But negotiation takes place in the jury’s shadow (Galanter 1990). Multiple empirical
studies confirm the influence of anticipated jury verdicts on settlement decisions by insurance
claims adjusters (Ross 1970; Metzloff 1991). For example, Metzloff (1991, p. 88), writing in the
medical malpractice setting, concludes: “While the number of litigated outcomes is modest, the
jury is a real and present influence.” Our conversations with the Insurer, moreover, suggest that
these effects matter in its business. For example, one claims adjuster reported that, when assessing
claims, adjusters consider how a jury would respond even though the probability of a jury trial is
very small.
Several empirical patterns would be consistent with this explanation: (1) claim severity
should not increase, as police behavior is not worsening; (2) claimants’ win rate should rise, as
jurors increasingly favor plaintiffs in close cases; and (3) average payouts should increase,

19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

especially around 2014, as jurors return higher damages awards upon finding liability. No firm
predictions about the number of claims or total payouts are warranted.
Our data bear out all of these predictions. As discussed above, we find no evidence of
increasing claim severity. Figure 3, meanwhile, does show a rising claimant win rate (bottom-left
graph) and rising average payouts, with a spike in 2014 (top-right graph). There is also external
evidence consistent with this explanation. In Philadelphia, for example, the average damages for
police shooting cases—the severity of which cannot rise over time—more than tripled between
2010 and 2014 (Elinson and Frosch 2015). And while anecdotal in nature, we think it not
insignificant that insiders on all sides of the debate—insurers, plaintiffs’ lawyers, city attorneys,
and law enforcement experts—agree that “current scrutiny of law enforcement” and “shifting
attitudes toward police” are affecting the direction and magnitude of case outcomes (Elinson and
Frosch 2015; Winton 2017: “Jurors are now less likely to give law enforcement the benefit of the
doubt and more likely to award larger sums to plaintiffs, driving up the cost of judgments and
emboldening attorneys to seek larger settlements during negotiations, experts said.”).
4.3. The Importance of Data Selection
4.3.1. Claims Data vs. Lawsuit Data: Substantive Composition and Payout Magnitude
Given that insurance claims data may be difficult to obtain (see Section 5.2), it is worth
examining the extent to which other data sources might substitute. Figure 5 suggests reason for
caution on this point, as the trends in claims, lawsuits, and lawsuits with payouts differ markedly.
Indeed, if, like prior researchers, we had used lawsuits or lawsuits with payouts as a proxy for
police-inflicted harms over the past decade or so, we would have reached the opposite conclusion:
we would have concluded, that is, that policing harms were increasing rather than decreasing. In
this subsection, we investigate whether these data sources—claims, lawsuits, and lawsuits with
payouts—differ along additional dimensions. We find that they do.
We first compare the universe of all claims to the subsets of claims that are commonly
employed in academic research. In the top-left graph of Figure 6, we present the distribution of
types of claims for all claims (1995 to 2015) and the 32% of claims that involve lawsuits,
respectively. Use of force and illegal seizures of a person generate the majority of lawsuits, while
property claims are much more common overall. Lawsuit data, in other words, drastically
undercount the incidence of property harms. Payouts also vary between claims that do and do not
go to court (Figure 6, bottom-left graph). Average payouts are significantly higher for excessive
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force and sexual misconduct claims that involve a lawsuit, for example. This does not mean that
lawsuits cause higher payouts, because of selection. It does mean, however, that estimates of
average payouts calculated using lawsuit data will be biased upward, as we discuss in more detail
below. Claims that go to court differ significantly from those that do not in both type and severity.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Many papers that study police liability match lawsuit data—which rarely includes
settlement amounts—with payout data (Iris 2012, 2014; Rozema and Schanzenbach 2019;
Schwartz 2014, 2016). Requiring both a lawsuit and a positive payout narrows the sample to only
8% of all claims in our dataset, as Table 2 shows. As the right column of Figure 6 illustrates, this
small subset of claims differs from the larger sample in both substantive composition (top graph)
and average payouts made (bottom graph). Again, use of force and illegal seizures of a person are
overrepresented, and property harms underrepresented, relative to the overall sample. The
distortion is even greater when considering average payouts. Without any zero-dollar claims, and
with presumably very few low-value claims due to the costs of litigation, the average-payout value
in this subset is more than ten times what it is in the overall sample of claims. Furthermore, because
many claims involve neither a lawsuit nor a payout, even data containing all lawsuits (regardless
of payout) and all payouts (regardless of lawsuit) would miss a large fraction of allegations: on
average, for all types of claims, 46% (Table 2, column 4). And this is not the case only for minor
infractions: for example, 58% of sexual-misconduct and 53% of excessive-force claims lead
neither to a lawsuit nor to a payout.16
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
One might argue that property harms, the least egregious among the claim types, are not
worth much attention. If we disregard these minor claims, do claims data still differ systematically
from the other data types? In unreported analysis, we reproduce several of our key figures after
dropping property claims from the dataset. We find that, when we omit property claims, the
substantive composition of claims does converge for claims and lawsuits (as well as lawsuits with
payouts, though to a lesser extent). At the same time, the average magnitudes of payouts across
claim types continue to differ substantially when we compare claims to lawsuits or lawsuits with

16 Some of these claims may be frivolous, and so focusing on those that make it through the legal system selects
for claims with legal merit. Given our results in Section 4.2, however, another possible interpretation is that, in earlier
periods, the public was more trusting of the police and tolerant of the harms they cause.
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payouts. Likewise, the aggregate time trends in number of claims, lawsuits, and lawsuits with
payouts remain distinct when we omit property claims.
In addition, even though property claims result in low average payouts and involve no
physical harm to civilians, they do shed light on civilian interactions with the police. Each property
claim represents an occasion on which a civilian believes a law enforcement officer has damaged
or destroyed his property. Even a relatively low-value claim—a damaged door or window, a
broken smartphone, or a scratched vehicle, for example—may reflect a substantial monetary
shock, especially for poorer households. Moreover, frequent property damage by officers may be
interpreted as a sign of disrespect that can breed distrust within the community. Research
consistently finds that people form views about police legitimacy based not only on their own
interactions with officers but also what they hear from their neighbors and friends (Mazerolle et
al. 2013). Yet precisely because property claims are underrepresented in other data sources,
researchers likely undercount the frequency of property damage and all that follows from it. Claims
data helpfully bring these incidents to light.
4.3.2. Selection of Disputes for Adjudication
Even if lawsuits and lawsuits with payouts are not representative of the broader universe
of claims, one recent study suggests that researchers might use adjudicated claims to proxy for the
whole. “Adjudicated” claims are the subset of claims that are resolved by a dispositive motion or
trial verdict—all of which necessarily involve lawsuits—regardless whether the judgment favored
the plaintiff or the defendant. In recent empirical work using New York litigation data from
contingent-fee cases, Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018) find that the average judgment amount
for adjudicated claims is very close to the average settlement, and the distributions of settlements
and adjudicated damages are quite similar. This was a surprising finding that runs contrary to the
influential Priest-Klein hypothesis, which holds that “the disputes selected for litigation (as
opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of
all disputes” (Priest and Klein 1984, p. 4).
To see whether Helland, Klerman, and Lee’s (2018) finding holds in our distinct
institutional environment, we replicate the comparison they draw between “adjudicated” and
“settled” claims (see Helland et al. 2017 for a detailed description of their data), using the same
definitions of these terms as in their paper. “Adjudicated” claims, as stated, include claims that are
resolved by motion or trial verdict. “Settled” claims include all claims that are not adjudicated but
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that result in some payout being made, regardless whether a lawsuit was filed—in other words, all
negotiated payments, not just those that resolve a lawsuit. Following Helland, Klerman, and Lee
(2018), our specification of settled claims does not include unadjudicated claims that lead to no
payout for whatever reason, such as claims that were voluntarily dismissed or abandoned by
claimants. There are no zero-dollar settlements, that is. Settled claims also exclude claims for
which the Insurer denied coverage.
In Figure 7, we compare the substantive composition (top graph) and average payouts
(bottom graph) for settled and adjudicated claims. The substantive composition of claims varies
between the adjudicated and settled samples (Figure 7, top row). Knowing what share of
adjudicated claims involve the seizure of property, for example, does not allow one to estimate the
share of settled claims of that same type. It does not appear that Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018)
were able to disaggregate their data by substantive case type, so it is unclear whether their data
would have resembled ours in this respect. Likewise, we do not replicate the payout-related
findings of Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018): the average judgment amount in our data ($3,562)
is an order of magnitude lower than the average settlement ($32,072) (Table 3, bottom row), and
the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001). At least within our sample, then, a researcher
without access to settlement data cannot estimate the average-settlement value by reference to the
average adjudicated judgment. The same is true for claims of different substantive types, such as
excessive force (Figure 7, bottom row). The extent to which these results will hold in other police
liability datasets is unclear.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]
The contrast between our results and Helland, Klerman, and Lee’s (2018) may reflect
differences in the institutional environments we study. Our data contain exclusively claims against
public law enforcement agencies; theirs encompass contingent-fee cases involving personal injury,
property damage, and wrongful death, as well as condemnation and change of grade (Helland et
al. 2017). Although, as noted, Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018) do not disaggregate their data by
case type, their contingent-fee cases very likely include a significant number of tort suits against
private defendants. It may be that the defendants in our dataset more frequently face asymmetric
stakes in litigation. Public defendants, for example, may incur greater reputational costs from
adverse judgments and, as repeat players, have incentives to “play for rules” that will govern future
disputes (Galanter 1974). Where defendants have more at stake than plaintiffs from adverse
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judgments, defendants can be expected to settle all but the cases they are likeliest to win, driving
down the expected plaintiff win rate (Priest and Klein 1984) and potentially pushing apart the
average judgment and average settlement amounts. Indeed, in Helland, Klerman, and Lee’s (2018)
data, plaintiffs won 29% of adjudicated cases; in ours, plaintiffs win only 3.9% (authors’
calculations, not reported). If we were to assume a 29% win rate in our own data, and assume
(perhaps unrealistically) that average judgments would be the same for those 29% as they are for
the 3.9%, then the overall average judgment amount would be around $26,000—substantially
closer to the average settlement amount of $32,072.
We also observe that the difference between the average judgment and average settlement
is highly sensitive to how we specify claims as “settled.” As explained above, Helland, Klerman,
and Lee (2018) exclude all unadjudicated claims that result in no payout (defined as “Settled (1)”
in Table 3), which constitute 13% of their cases. They acknowledge that “such cases could be
classified as settlements for $0” but argue that they “probably reflect nuisance suits the defendant
refused to settle or cases where investigation or discovery revealed that the plaintiff’s case was
very weak” (p. 146). If, however, we recode unadjudicated, zero-dollar claims as “settled” for $0
(defined as “Settled (2) in Table 3)—which seems to us an equally plausible way of interpreting
the data—the average judgment ($3,562) and average settlement ($13,574) grow closer but the
difference between them remains statistically significant (p = 0.006).
Similarly, Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018) had the somewhat unusual opportunity—as
we do—to observe settlements where no lawsuit was ever filed. In many settings, researchers will
never learn of such disputes. With this in mind, if we restrict the universe of claims to those in
which a lawsuit was filed—treating settlement as settlement of a lawsuit (defined as “Settled (3)”
in Table 3—the average judgment ($3,562) and average settlement ($95,307) instead diverge even
further (p < 0.001). Table 3 compares the composition and average-payout figures for adjudicated
claims with those of settled claims defined in these three different ways.
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
5. DISCUSSION
In Section 5.1, we comment on some implications of our research. We then review the
principal limitations of our data and analysis in Section 5.2.
5.1. Research Implications
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Three implications of our analysis deserve mention. First, in our sample, as we move up
the pyramid from claims to lawsuits to payouts, the composition of cases changes substantially.
Claims that involve litigation differ systematically from claims that do not, in terms of both type
and severity, and adjudicated claims differ systematically from settled claims. All of this is
consistent with the Priest-Klein hypothesis but in contrast to Helland, Klerman, and Lee’s (2018)
recent empirical contribution to the Priest-Klein literature. More research is warranted, for
example to explore whether there are particular institutional environments in which the PriestKlein hypothesis is more or less likely to hold. Future research can assess whether selection effects
will manifest similarly, in terms of direction and magnitude, even in other policing datasets. For
now, we recommend caution when drawing inferences from litigation data about the composition
or severity of policing harms.
Second, and relatedly, having demonstrated the value of insurance claims data to the
academic study of policing, we hope future researchers will pursue this data source and additional
insurers will consider making their data available for study. By analogy, researchers have
leveraged to great effect the wider availability of aggregate data on closed claims for medical
malpractice (Black et al. 2005; Vidmar et al. 2005). Given the social salience of contemporary
American policing, the value of wider access to claims data could be significant. It would shed
light not only on other jurisdictions but also on the behavior of other insurers.
Third, in the immediate term, we can use our data to generate multipliers that estimate the
numerical relationships among claims, lawsuits, and lawsuits with payouts, respectively. As an
illustration, we then use these multipliers to benchmark prior studies. A number of recent papers,
which focus on civil rights cases, match lawsuit data with payout data and report case counts and
average-payout figures (see, for example, Iris 2012, 2014; Rozema & Schanzenbach 2019). Using
the multipliers generated by different cuts of our own data, we show how those estimates might be
adjusted to reflect differences among data sources. In principle, future researchers could use these
multipliers in similar ways on other datasets.
For this benchmarking exercise, to mirror the prior literature, we limit our data to civil
rights claims. We approximate this category by removing from our dataset property-damage,
negligence, and unclassified (“Other”) claims. In panel A of Table 4, we report the number of
claims and average payout per claim, in 2015 dollars, for three different splits of the data: all civil
rights claims, civil rights claims involving a lawsuit, and civil rights claims involving a lawsuit
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and a positive payout. In panel B, we present ratios of claim counts and average payout. The idea
is to estimate the extent to which data on lawsuits with positive payouts may lead researchers to
understate the number of claims for compensation and overstate average payouts, relative to data
on all claims or all lawsuits.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The values in Table 4 indicate that, had we used data on claims that led to both a lawsuit
and a positive payout, like much of the existing literature, we would have painted a very different
picture of the volume and consequences of demands for compensation from the police. There are
many fewer claims that result in lawsuits with payouts, or even just in lawsuits, than there are
overall; conversely, average payouts are much larger for claims with lawsuits and payouts than for
all lawsuits or all claims. For example, we would have undercounted by a factor of 8.3 (=1/0.12
in the first column of panel B of Table 4) the number of demands for compensation from the police.
At the same time, we would have overstated the average payout per demand by a factor of 7.6 had
we used data on lawsuits that led to positive payouts instead of data on all claims (second column
of panel B of table 4). Similar calculations can be used to compare lawsuits with payouts to all
lawsuits.
Ratios like these could inform how we interpret other research. For example, using data
from Chicago on civil rights lawsuits that paid out between 2006 and 2012, Iris (2014) reports an
average-payout figure of $112,335. If the ratios of payouts are similar in Chicago and our context,
then the average payout including lawsuits that did not result in payouts would be closer to
$30,400, and more like $14,800 including claims that never ripened into lawsuits. Similarly,
Rozema and Schanzenbach (2019) find that, between 2009 and 2014, the average payout for civil
rights lawsuits in Chicago was $329,322, for lawsuits that led to positive payouts. We might then
predict that, for all lawsuits (all claims, respectively), the average payout would be closer to
$89,000 ($43,000, respectively).
We emphasize that these ratios are offered principally to illustrate a concept. It is entirely
possible that different ratios characterize different settings. Indeed, Iris (2014) suggests that, in
Chicago, very few civil rights claims are brought outside of court. Perhaps residents of smaller,
more tight-knit communities—like many of those in our dataset—are more hesitant to file lawsuits
or seek large recoveries that could burden a modest tax base (Black 1972). Even within a single
jurisdiction, different insurers might generate different ratios as well, depending upon factors
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including settlement strategy. Indeed, we find that, even in our own dataset, the ratios change over
time. We calculated number-of-claims and average-payout ratios for different five-year time
windows in our data (results available on demand). In the most recent five-year window, the
average-payout ratios are smaller than in earlier years: payouts for civil rights claims with lawsuits
and positive payouts are 2.5 times higher than for all civil rights claims with lawsuits, and 4.4
times higher than payouts for all civil rights claims. Even these smaller ratios, however, indicate
large differences in the magnitude of payouts depending on the dataset employed.
5.2. Limitations
The data we employ are rich and closer to the “base of the pyramid,” so to speak, than
lawsuit or payout data. That said, there remain important limitations to our data that should be kept
in mind when interpreting or extending our results.
First, we have data only on incidents in which an individual demanded, or was anticipated
to demand, financial compensation for a covered, police-related harm. This means our data do not
include what might be called “victimless” police malfeasance, such as an officer using a controlled
substance while on duty. Nor do they capture police behavior like “discourtesy” that, while
offensive or undesirable in some respects—and while not “victimless”—creates no plausible claim
of compensable harm. Claims data also omit misconduct that is clearly excluded under the
Insurer’s policy, such as acts committed outside an officer’s official capacity.
Second, we observe only incidents that were reported to the Insurer. Localities may resolve
some covered, police-related incidents without reporting them, possibly in a perceived effort to
control their premiums. Our dataset would not capture these occurrences. These incidents,
however, are likely rare and minor in magnitude. Policyholders are contractually obligated to
report each covered occurrence to the Insurer promptly. Failing to report even a minor occurrence,
which could result in the denial of coverage, is risky because seemingly small claims can escalate.
Premiums are experience rated but they are not sensitive enough to respond meaningfully to any
particular police liability claim. The Insurer’s experience-modification adjustment is calculated
across several years of claims, over all lines of liability—not just policing—and caps the impact
of large losses. Moreover, many localities carry an aggregate deductible, which creates an
additional incentive to report: if the locality is going to pay out, it might as well get credit for the
payment against its deductible, so that coverage kicks in sooner for future claims. The Insurer also
assists policyholders in evaluating and processing claims, executing adequate releases, and dealing
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with the tax implications of payments, complications localities would need to handle
independently if they declined to report claims.
Third, all of our data come from a single insurer in a single midsized state, which we have
agreed not to identify, raising questions about external validity. Part of what we are measuring is
the behavior of this particular insurer (see Schwartz, forthcoming). The decline in claims we
observe, for example, may stem in part from the Insurer’s efforts to reduce policing harms (and
therefore claims), efforts that other insurers may not match. The state we study, moreover, is
relatively racially homogeneous, especially outside of the largest municipalities, several of which
self-insure and thus are not included in our data. It is possible that trends in policing differ in more
heterogeneous settings. Kane and White (2013) also suggest the possibility of regional variation
in the types and prevalence of police misconduct. At the same time, most law enforcement agencies
in the United States are small, and the population in small-town and rural communities is heavily
white—78%, compared to 64% in the country overall and 44% in urban areas (Housing Assistance
Council 2012). Nor are policing harms confined to the big city. Recall that roughly two-thirds of
police-related fatalities occur outside the nation’s 100 largest cities; relatedly, roughly half of all
individuals killed by the police are white (Mapping Police Violence 2019). There are also distinct
methodological advantages to working within a single state. State-level effects—including state
law and other state characteristics—are held constant. And where, as here, a single entity collects
all of the data, data-consistency concerns are greatly reduced.
Fourth, we cannot directly measure the rate of police-inflicted harms; there is selection into
claims. Insurance claims, that is, reflect the behavior of claimants and (in some instances) their
lawyers as well as that of the police. The decision whether to make a demand depends on factors
including the putative claimant’s perception of whether the grievance is worth pursuing as well as
her knowledge of the law and legal institutions. The relatively stable trend we observe in the
number of claims per year, for instance, could reflect stability in police behavior. We would see
the same trend, however, if policing harms increased (decreased) but selection into claims
decreased (increased). In Section 4.2.1, we attempted to identify and rule out the most obvious
explanations for why selection into claims may have changed over time, and we are not aware of
any other well-motivated explanation. But we cannot rule out the possibility. Nevertheless, nearly
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every familiar data source, especially when it comes to crime and victimization, suffers from this
shortfall.17
Finally, insurance claims data may be proprietary and thus difficult to obtain. Some civilian
complaint data, in contrast, and all lawsuit data, are public record. Still, especially for longitudinal
or cross-jurisdictional purposes, these other data sources are not as readily accessible as it may
seem. As we discussed in Section 2.1, civilian complaint data may be unavailable or unreliable
especially in smaller cities, and many jurisdictions purge these data after a few years. Gathering
lawsuit data on police misconduct across any significant span of time or space is also challenging
and prone to measurement error. Rozema and Schanzenbach (2019) describe the process, which
involves keyword searches followed by manual review, one jurisdiction at a time.

6. CONCLUSION
Motivated by sharply heightened public scrutiny of the police in recent years, we examined
a new data source, insurance claims data, in an effort to disentangle trends in police behavior from
the responses of legal actors such as lawyers, judges, and juries. We found that, over time, the
number and substantive composition of claims have held relatively stable in our sample, while the
claimant win rate, total and average payouts, and (more recently) number of lawsuits all have
increased. After considering several potential explanations, we interpreted these trends to suggest
that the incidence of policing harms has not been rising in our sample, nor has the substantive
nature of those harms been changing in observable ways. Instead, society has likely grown
increasingly intolerant of policing harms, leading to more claimant victories and larger recoveries
as claims are settled in the jury’s shadow. The basic methodological take-away is that existing data
sources capture vastly different types and amounts of harmful policing.
The policy implications of our findings are less clear. Rising payouts per claim, we have
argued, seem to signal increasing societal awareness of, and concern about, harmful policing. This
could be an optimistic story about the power of protest and public-influence campaigns, if rising
payouts are leading agencies to pursue productive reforms. But it also points to the critical role of
the insurer, which, by converting payouts to premiums, mediates the relationship between payouts

17 One possible exception is field observation data (see, for example, Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina 1996; Terrill
and Reisig 2003). Field observation presents its own difficulties, however. It is difficult to scale and prone to reactivity
bias.
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and incentives for reform. Some insurers, for example, may pin premiums tightly to payouts,
creating the sort of behavioral incentives proponents of civil liability imagine. Others, however,
may prioritize rate stability as a service to their policyholders, raising the possibility of moral
hazard, as rising payouts fail to translate into rising costs for policyholders. Further research might
investigate the relationship between police liability claims experience and subsequent premiums
and, even more important, between premiums and subsequent police behavior.
We conclude with two parting disclaimers. First, our message is not that policing is selfimproving—just give it time, and the incidence of harm will fall. While our findings do not bear
on the question, the decline in claims may have resulted from policy efforts on all sides of the
issues, including but not limited to the Insurer’s loss-prevention initiatives. Falling crime and arrest
rates may have helped as well. Second, we do not suggest that, because claims are declining, they
are necessarily low enough. They could be declining, that is, but still be higher than the socially
optimal level. To dramatize the point, homicide rates have been falling for many centuries, if not
millennia, and “today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species’ existence” (Pinker
2011, p. xxi). But few who are living in “high-crime” neighborhoods in America’s cities would
report that all is well. Progress does not warrant complacency.

REFERENCES
Anwar, Shamena, and Hanming Fang. 2006. An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor
Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence. American Economic Review 96:127-51.
Ba, Bocar A. 2018. Going the Extra Mile: The Cost of Complaint Filing, Accountability, and
Law Enforcement Outcomes in Chicago. Working paper.
Barrett, Kevin J., Maria (Maki) Haberfeld, and Michael C. Walker. 2009. A Comparative Study
of the Attitudes of Urban, Suburban and Rural Police Officers in New Jersey Regarding the Use
of Force. Crime, Law and Social Change 52:159-79.
Baude, William. 2018. Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? California Law Review 106:45-90.
Black, Bernard, Charles Silver, David A. Hyman, and William M. Sage. 2005. Stability, Not
Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002. Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 2:207-59.
Black, Donald J. 1972. The Boundaries of Legal Sociology. Yale Law Journal 81:1086-1100.

30
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

Campbell, Bradley A., Justin Nix, Edward R. Maguire. 2017. Is the Number of Citizens Fatally
Shot by Police Increasing in the Post-Ferguson Era? Crime and Delinquency 64:398-420.
Chandrasekher, Andrea Cann. 2016. The Effect of Police Slowdowns on Crime. American Law
and Economics Review 18: 385-437.
_____. 2017. Police Labor Unrest and Lengthy Contract Negotiations: Does Police Misconduct
Increase with Time Spent Out of Contract? Working paper.
Chanin, Joshua. 2016. Evaluating Section 14141: An Empirical Review of Pattern or Practice
Police Misconduct Reform. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 14:67-112.
Crow, Matthew S., and Brittany Adrion. 2011. Focal Concerns and Police Use of Force:
Examining the Factors Associated with Taser Use. Police Quarterly 12:366-87.
Delehanty, Casey, Jack Mewhirter, Ryan Welch, and Jason Wilks. 2017. Militarization and Police
Violence: The Case of the 1033 Program. Research and Politics April-June:1-7.
Desmond, Matthew, Andrew V. Papachristos, and Davis S. Kirk. 2016. Police Violence and
Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black Community. American Sociological Review 81:857-76.
Dharmapala, Dhammika, Richard H. McAdams, and John Rappaport. 2019. Collective Bargaining
Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida. Working paper.
Eisenberg, Theodore. 1982. Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study. Cornell
Law Review 67:482-556.
Elinson, Zusha, and Dan Frosch. 2015. Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities.
Wall Street Journal, July 15.
Falcone, David N., L. Edward Wells, and Ralph A. Weisheit. 2002. The Small-Town Police
Department. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 25:371-84.
Fox, Justin. 2017. Violent Crime Isn’t Just a Big-City Thing. Bloomberg, September 25.
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-25/violent-crime-isn-t-just-a-big-city-thing
(last updated May 28, 2018).
Fryer Jr., Roland G. 2019. An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force.
Journal of Political Economy 127:1210-61.
Galanter, Marc. 1990. The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process. University of Chicago
Legal Forum 1990:201-71.
_____. 1974. Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change.
Law and Society Review 9:95-160.

31
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

Garcia, Venessa, and Liqun Cao. 2005. Race and Satisfaction with the Police in a Small City.
Journal of Criminal Justice 33:191-99.
Harmon, Rachel A. 2013. Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing? Marquette Law Review
97:1119-46.
Helland, Eric, Daniel Klerman, Brendan Dowling, and Alexander Kappner. 2017. Contingent Fee
Litigation in New York City. Vanderbilt Law Review 70:1971-92.
Helland, Eric, Daniel M. Klerman, and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee. 2018. Maybe There’s No Bias in the
Selection of Disputes for Litigation. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 174:14370.
Hickman, Matthew J. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice
Statistics. 2006. Citizen Complaints About Police Use of Force.
Hickman, Matthew J., and Jane E. Poore. 2016. National Data on Citizen Complaints About Police
Use of Force: Data Quality Concerns and the Potential (Mis)Use of Statistical Evidence To
Address Police Agency Conduct. Criminal Justice Policy Review 27:455-79.
Housing Assistance Council. 2012. Race & Ethnicity in Rural America.
http://www.ruralhome.org/storage/research_notes/rrn-race-and-ethnicity-web.pdf (last updated
August 17, 2019)
Infinite Suburbia. 2017. Edited by Alan M. Berger, Joel Kotkin, with Celina Balderas Guzmán.
New York: Princeton Architectural Press.
Iris, Mark. 2012. Illegal Searches in Chicago: The Outcomes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Litigation. Saint
Louis University Public Law Review 32:123-45.
Iris, Mark. 2014. Your Tax Dollars at Work! Chicago Police Lawsuit Payments: How Much, and
for What? Virginia Journal of Criminal Law 2:25-61.
Jennings, Jay T., and Meghan E. Rubato. 2017. Preventing the Use of Deadly Force: The
Relationship Between Police Agency Policies and Rates of Office-Involved Gun Deaths. Public
Administration Review 77:217-26.
Jones, Jeffrey M. 2015. In U.S., Confidence in Police Lowest in 22 Years. Gallup, June 19.
https://news.gallup.com/poll/183704/confidence-police-lowest-years.aspx
(last
updated
December 16, 2018).
Kane, Robert J. 2007. Collect and Release Data on Coercive Police Actions. Criminology and
Public Policy 6:773-80.
Kane, Robert J., and Michael D. White. 2013. Jammed Up: Bad Cops, Police Misconduct, and the
New York City Police Department. New York, N.Y.: New York University Press.

32
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

_____. 2009. A Study of Career-Ending Misconduct Among New York City Police Officers.
Criminology and Public Policy 8:737-69.
Kaplan, Jacob. 2017. Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Offenses Known and Clearances
by Arrest, 1960-2016. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research. http://doi.org/10.3886/E100707V2.
Kappeler, Victor E. 2006. Critical Issues in Police Civil Liability. 4th ed. Long Grove, Ill.:
Waveland Press.
King, Shaun. 2015. Police Brutality Is Getting Worse and Shows No Signs of Slowing Down.
Daily Kos, September 22. https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2015/9/22/1423847/-Policebrutality-is-getting-worse-and-shows-no-signs-of-slowing-down (last updated October 20, 2018).
_____. 2018. Data Shows Police Brutality in America Is Getting Worse—2018 Could Be the Most
Deadly in Years. The Appeal, April 17. https://theappeal.org/in-louisiana-threatening-to-file-acomplaint-against-police-can-lead-to-a-five-year-prison-4cece4c63edc (lasted updated November
26, 2018).
Kotkin, Joel, and Alan M. Berger. 2017. The Future of America’s Suburbs Looks Infinite. Orange
County Register, November 19.
Lawson, Jr., Edward. 2018. Police Militarization and the Use of Lethal Force. Police Research
Quarterly 1-13.
Legewie, Joscha, and Jeffrey Fagan. 2016. Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly
Use of Police Force. Working paper 14-512. Columbia Law School, New York, NY.
Leong, Nancy. 2012. Making Rights. Boston University Law Review 92:405-81.
Lersch, Kim Michelle, and Tom Mieczkowski. 2000. An Examination of the Convergence and
Divergence of Internal and External Allegations of Misconduct Filed Against Police Officers.
Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 23:54-68.
Levitt, Steven D. and Thomas J. Miles. 2006. Economic Contributions to the Understanding of
Crime. Annual Review of Law and Social Science 2:147-64.
Liederbach, John. 2005. Addressing the “Elephant in the Living Room”: An Observational Study
of the Work of Suburban Police. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies &
Management 28:415-34.
_____. 2007. Controlling Suburban and Small-Town Hoods: An Examination of Police
Encounters with Juveniles. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice 5:107-24.
Lytle, Daniel J., and Ryan Randa. 2015. The Effects of Police Satisfaction on Fear of Crime in a
Semirural Setting. International Criminal Justice Review 25:301-17.

33
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

Mapping Police Violence. 2019. https://mappingpoliceviolence.org/nationaltrends (last updated
July 23, 2019).
Mas, Alexandre. 2006. Pay, Reference Points, and Police Performance. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 121:783:821.
Mastrofski, Stephen D., Jeffrey B. Snipes, and Anne E. Supina. 1996. Compliance on Demand:
The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency
33:269-305.
Mazerolle, Lorraine, Emma Antrobus, Sarah Bennett, and Tom R. Tyler. 2013. Shaping Citizen
Perceptions of Police Legitimacy: A Randomized Field Trial of Procedural Justice. Criminology
51:33-64.
McCoy, Candace. 2010. How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing. Pp. 111-60 in
Holding Police Accountable, edited by Candace McCoy. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press.
McLaughlin, Eliott C. 2015. We’re Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News Coverage.
CNN, April 21.
Mesic, Aldina, Lydia Franklin, Alev Cansever, Fiona Potter, Anika Sharma, Anita Knopov, and
Michael Siegel. 2018. The Relationship Between Structural Racism and Black-White Disparities
in Fatal Police Shootings at the State Level. Journal of the National Medical Association 110:10616.
Metzloff, Thomas B. 1991. Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury’s Shadow. Law and
Contemporary Problems 54:43-129.
Morgan, Stephen L., and Joel A. Pally. 2016. Ferguson, Gray, and Davis: An Analysis of Recorded
Crime Incidents and Arrests in Baltimore City, March 2010 through December 2015. Unpublished
manuscript. Johns Hopkins University, March. http://socweb.soc.jhu.edu/faculty/morgan/papers/
MorganPally2016.pdf (last updated September 29, 2018).
Morin, Rich, Kim Parker, Renee Stepler, and Andrew Mercer. 2017. Behind the Badge. Pew
Research Center, January 11. http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-the-badge (last
updated September 29, 2018).
Nicholson-Crotty, Sean, Jill Nicholson-Crotty, and Sergio Fernandez. 2017. Will More Black
Cops Matter? Officer Race and Police-Involved Homicides of Black Citizens. Public
Administration Review 77:206-16.
NYC Civilian Complaint Review Board. 2017. Annual Report. https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/ccrb/
downloads/pdf/policy_pdf/annual_bi-annual/2017_annual.pdf (last updated July 22, 2019).

34
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

Parker, Karen F., John M. MacDonald, Wesley G. Jennings, and Geoffrey P. Alpert. 2005. Racial
Threat, Urban Conditions and Police Use of Force: Assessing the Direct and Indirect Linkages
Across Multiple Urban Areas. Justice Research and Policy 7:53-79.
Payne, Brian K., Bruce L. Berg, and Ivan Y. Sun. 2005. Policing in Small Town America: Dogs,
Drunks, Disorder, and Disfunction. Journal of Criminal Justice 33:31-41.
Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York,
N.Y.: Viking Penguin.
Powell, Zachary A., Michele Bisaccia Meitl, and John L. Worrall. 2017. Police Consent Decrees
and Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation. Criminology and Public Policy 16:575-605.
Priest, George L., and Benjamin Klein. 1984. The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. Journal of
Legal Studies 13:1-55.
Rappaport, John. 2017. How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police. Harvard Law Review
130:1539-1614.
Ratcliffe, Michael, Charlynn Burd, Kelly Holder, and Alison Fields. 2016. Defining Rural at the
U.S. Census Bureau. https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/acs/
acsgeo-1.pdf (last updated July 22, 2019).
Reaves, Brian A. U.S. Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice
Statistics. 2015. Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices.
Ross, Cody T. 2015. A Multi-Level Bayesian Analysis of Racial Bias in Police Shootings at the
County-Level in the United States, 2011-2014. PLoS ONE 10:1-34.
Ross, Darrell L. 2000. Emerging Trends in Police Failure To Train Liability. Policing: An
International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 23:169-93.
Ross, Darrell L., and Madhava R. Bodapati. 2006. A Risk Management Analysis of the Claims,
Litigation, and Losses of Michigan Law Enforcement Agencies: 1985-1999. Policing: An
International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 29:38-57.
Ross, H. Laurence. 1970. Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims
Adjustments. Chicago, Ill.: Aldine Publishing Co.
Rozema, Kyle, and Max Schanzenbach. 2019. Good Cop, Bad Cop: Using Civilian Allegations to
Predict Police Misconduct. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11:225-68.
Schwartz, Joanna C. 2014. Police Indemnification. NYU Law Review 89:885-1005.
_____. 2016. How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform. UCLA Law Review
1144-1298.

35
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

_____. Forthcoming. Civil Rights Ecosystems. Michigan Law Review.
Shjarback, John A., David C. Pyrooz, Scott E. Wolfe, and Scott H. Decker. 2017. De-Policing and
Crime in the Wake of Ferguson: Racialized Changes in the Quantity and Quality of Policing
Among Missouri Police Departments. Journal of Criminal Justice 50:42-52.
Smith, Brad W. 2004. Structural and Organizational Predictors of Homicide by Police. Policing:
An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 27:539-57.
Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth, and Hal Varian. 2015. A Hands-On Guide to Google Data. Permanent
working paper. http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/2015/primer.pdf.
Terrill, William, Fredrik H. Leinfelt, and Dae-Hoon Kwak. 2008. Examining Police Use of Force:
A Smaller Agency Perspective. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and
Management 31: 57-76.
Terrill, William, and Michael D. Reisig. 2003. Neighborhood Context and Police Use of Force.
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 40:291-321.
Toner, Casey, and Jared Rutecki. 2018. 113 Suburban Cop Shootings, Zero Discipline. WBEZ
Chicago. http://interactive.wbez.org/taking-cover/zero-discipline (last updated May 12, 2018).
Vidmar, Neil, Paul Lee, Kara MacKillop, Kieran McCarthy, and Gerald McGwin. 2005.
Uncovering the “Invisible” Profile of Medical Malpractice Litigation: Insights from Florida.
DePaul Law Review 54:315-56.
Walker, Samuel, and Charles M. Katz. 2008. The Police in America: An Introduction. 6th ed.
Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Weisheit, Ralph A., L. Edward Wells, and David N. Falcone. 1995. Crime and Policing in Rural
and Small-Town America: An Overview of the Issues. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of
Justice.
Wines, Michael, and Sarah Cohen. 2015. Police Killings Rising Slightly, Data Suggests. New York
Times, April 30.
Winton, Richard. 2017. Sheriff’s Department Misconduct-Claim Payouts Have Soared, Topping
$50 Million Last Year. Los Angeles Times, April 9.
Worrall, John L., and Ricky S. Gutierrez. 1999. Potential Consequences of Community-Oriented
Policing for Civil Liability: Is There a Dark Side to Employee Empowerment? Review of Public
Personnel Administration Spring:61-70.

36
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

Figure 1: Number of claims per year reported between 1995 and 2017 (including
open claims).
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Figure 2: Number of claims per year reported between 1995 and 2017 (including
open claims), by type of claim.
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Figure 3: Outcome of claims by year reported. Dollar amounts are inflationadjusted and presented in 2015 dollars.
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Figure 4: Distribution of payouts per claim, by year, for claims that led to
positive payouts.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325382

Figure 5: Number of claims per year: overall, with lawsuits, and with lawsuits
and positive payouts.
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Figure 6: Composition of claims and payouts: full sample, compared to claims
leading to a lawsuit (left column) and claims leading to both a lawsuit and a
positive payout (right column).
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Figure 7: Composition of claims and payouts: adjudicated claims compared to
settled claims.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Claims

Percent with
Type of Claim
Force
Sexual
Property Harm
Seizure of Person
Seizure of Property
Search
Discrimination
Negligence
Other
Overall

Payouts (real 2015 $)

Number
(1)

Suit
(2)

Payout
(3)

Mean
(4)

SD
(5)

Median
(6)

595
26
839
334
224
88
191
130
390

42
35
6
54
48
56
64
21
40

23
38
54
26
19
35
6
32
10

103, 600
100, 700
1, 200
32, 400
1, 700
45, 000
106, 500
13, 300
19, 300

252, 000
156, 300
5, 400
61, 900
3, 500
72, 800
279, 400
53, 500
35, 900

15, 300
44, 000
400
6, 900
200
9, 200
16, 600
2, 300
3, 600

2, 590

32

30

23, 700

116, 000

700

Note. Payout figures are for claims that led to positive payouts.
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17
31
2
18
5
26
6
7
7
8

Payout,
Suit
(1)
6
15
52
9
15
11
0
26
4
22

Payout
No Suit
(2)
25
12
5
36
44
32
58
15
34
24

No Payout,
Suit
(3)
53
58
42
38
38
35
36
55
56
46

No Payout,
No Suit
(4)
595
26
839
334
224
88
191
130
390
2590

0.23
0.01
0.32
0.13
0.09
0.03
0.07
0.05
0.15

Number Fraction of
of claims all claims
(5)
(6)

Note. Columns 1-4 present the percentage of claims of each type with and without a lawsuit and payout. Column 5 reports
the number of claims of each type. Column 6 reports the proportion of all claims made up of claims of each type.

Force
Sexual
Property Harm
Seizure of Person
Seizure of Property
Search
Discrimination
Negligence
Other
Overall

Type of Claim

Percent of claims with ...

Table 2: Claims by Type and Presence or Absence of Lawsuit and Payout
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27
0
10
24
14
7
8
1
24
177

Adjudicated

Settled
(1)
22
1
56
14
6
5
1
4
5
397

Settled
(2)
22
1
42
14
6
4
7
6
10
938

Settled
(3)
56
2
4
34
6
11
4
3
11
124
9, 416
483
8, 334
0
14, 981
0
0
0
3, 562

Adjudicated

Settled Settled
(1)
(2)
117, 952 49, 193
65, 602 21, 867
1, 553
882
35, 500 15, 019
1, 663
713
54, 950 26, 101
19, 795
1, 596
29, 594
8, 376
28, 732
6, 315
32, 072 13, 574

Settled
(3)
141, 208
65, 602
21, 301
42, 372
4, 434
69, 910
19, 795
95, 178
39, 371
95, 307

Mean Payouts (real 2015 $)

Note. Settled (1) follows Helland, Klerman, and Lee (2018) and includes only unadjudicated claims with positive payouts.
Settled (2) includes all unadjudicated claims, regardless whether payouts were made. Settled (3) includes only unadjudicated
claims in which a lawsuit was filed. Percentage values do not sum to 100 because some claims have multiple claim types.
Data are from claims opened after 2005, when information about claim resolution becomes available. In the “overall” row, left
panel, we report the number of claims in each claim-resolution category.

Force
Sexual
Property Harm
Seizure of Person
Seizure of Property
Search
Discrimination
Negligence
Other
Overall

Type of Claim

Percent of Claims

Table 3: Composition of Claims and Average Payouts: “Adjudicated” and “Settled” Claims
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Claims with lawsuit and
positive payout / all claims
Claims with lawsuit and positive
payout / claims with lawsuit

Panel B

All claims
Claims with lawsuit
Claims with lawsuit
and positive payout

Panel A

7.6
3.7

0.12
0.27

Ratio of
Payouts

98,440

159

Ratio of
Claim Counts

12,970
26,440

Mean Payout
(real 2015 $)

1,278
592

Number
of Claims

Table 4: Relationships Among Civil Rights Claims, Lawsuits, and Average Payouts
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Figure A.1: Monthly Google searches for “police brutality” in the United States:
2004 – 2017.
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Figure A.2: Number of newspaper articles per month mentioning “police brutality”: 1995 – 2017.
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Figure A.3: Number of open and closed claims, by year. The data for 2018 goes
until June 30th, 2018.
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2016
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Figure A.4: Number of claims per year between 1995 and 2017 that mention
officer-involved shootings (top figure) or vehicle pursuits (bottom figure).
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